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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DESERET LIVESTOCK COMPANY, a 
corporation, and ANSCHUTZ 
LAND & LIVESTOCK COMPANY, 
INC., a corporation, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 14008 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for damages by users of electric power 
against the supplier for damages to pumps and loss of crops and 
forage resulting from negligence of the supplier, for breach of 
its contract to supply electricity, and for bjcaach oJEwJjpo^ lijed 
warranties. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
After a full trial, the trial court, Honorable Stewart 
M. Hanson, granted the motion of defendant for dismissal made 
at the close of the plaintiff's case. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the judgment of the District 
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Court for errors in law and remand to the District Court for deter-
mination of damages. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
The appellants, who are the plaintiffs, will be referred 
to as Deseret and Hatch (Hatch being the name of the ranch which 
is owned by the appellant Anschutz), and the respondent as Power 
Company. 
Deseret and Hatch are owners of cattle and hay ranches 
in Skull Valley, which is south and west of Tooele in Tooele 
County. The ranches cannot raise hay or feed cattle without 
water (R. 7 and 28). Both appellants pump water from wells 
through use of electric motors (R. 7 and 27). On about June 20, 
1970, the pumps stopped on both ranches (R. 7 and 28). Both 
managers called Utah Electric Motor for assistance and under the 
direction of Al Nytch, whose deposition was taken, the pumps were 
repaired. 
Deseret had five pumps, of which three were running at 
the time of stoppage, one was seriously damaged, one needed super-
ficial attention, and one was not damaged (R. 8, 17). Hatch had 
two pumps running, of which one was seriously damaged (R. 28 and 38). 
In his deposition, Al Nytch testified that he was pump 
foreman for Utah Electric Motor and acquainted with the pumps and 
motors at the Deseret and Hatch ranches in Skull Valley prior to 
June 18, 1970 (Dep. 3). The pumps were damaged on June 20, 
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1970f and he was called Sunday morning, first by Wells Beck of 
Deseret (Dep. 17) and while at Deseret was called by George 
Slaugh of the Hatch ranch (Dep. 5, 17). The motors were 
undamaged, but one pump at each ranch was seriously damaged by 
having been operated in reverse (Dep. 3, 4, 7). The damage 
was caused by an outage, followed by a phase reversal, followed 
by a correction of the reversal, and the damage to the pumps was 
caused by operation of the motors and the pumps in reverse (Dep. 
12, 19, 20, 23 and 27). The phase reversal on a three-phase 
circuit can be caused only by man (Dep. 15) and a phase 
reversal can be corrected only by man (Dep. 26). The delay 
in getting the pumps operative was due to delay in getting necessary 
materials and parts (Dep. 7). Ordering new pumps rather 
than repair parts and materials would have run into the same delays 
(dep. 30, 31). 
Exhibit P-6 shows the location of the Deseret and Hatch 
ranches. The power comes to the ranches from the south and goes 
first to the Hatch ranch and then to Deseret. Mr. Nytch testified 
that a rj^ye^^ Deseret ranch could not 
cause damage_tp_the pump.onJ^ 
at Jth^ cauae-.damageJtQ^tb^.pv!mp iJLjtfe^  
Deserot^xmxch. A phase reversal south or upstream from the Hatch 
JESSLJS^ (Dep. 26-27). 
Arthur H. Nielson, Jr., the electrical engineer called 
a 
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by appellants, has had considerable experience with motors being 
reversed and testified that the reversal jnwistjbe. the^j^ 
errors It can occur no other way and only three-phase equipment is 
affected, doing no damage to the motors (R. 101). A phase reversal 
could not happen accidentally and could not occur while the motor 
was running (R. 106). To cause damage at both ranches, the phase 
reversal must have been caused by human error upstream from the 
Hatch ranch (R. 107). 
Dale Brown, a professional engineer employed by the Power 
Company, testified that a phase reversal involves "the reconnection 
in some manner of phase conductors so as to cause a rotation of 
the electrical current, one phase with respect to another, to change 
the direction." (R. 61) He testified that a phase reversal must 
be man-corrected (R. 62), and testified that it is conceivable that 
a phase reversal could result from a unique combination of circuits 
where a single-phase device is inadvertently opened by lightning 
and the right given combination of circuits in the vicinity might 
produce a temporary condition of phase reversal (R. 61-62). There 
was no evidence of any lightning at either ranch at the time in 
question or of any damage to any single phase appliances or outlets. 
Wells Beck testified that there was none at Deseret and George 
Slaugh testified that there was none at Hatch (R. 95 and 98). 
Dale Brown testified that a phase reversal at the Hatch 
ranch could not affect the Deseret ranch and that if phase reversals 
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occurred on the same day at both ranches, it would have been man 
caused or the coincidence of the unique circumstances postulated 
by him (R. 65). Mr. Nielson testified that the phase reversal 
must have been upstream from the Hatch ranch and could have been 
at the generating plant or at the substation (R. 107). 
The damage from the pumps being down was loss of crops 
of hay and forage. The pump at the Deseret covered 500 acres and 
^^^^^^^ 
cost 1,000 tons of hay, and the loss of pasturage for six weeks 
for 1,000 head of cattle (R. 9, 10). Sixty or seventy tons of 
protein block were also purchased (R. 17). Hay in 1970 was worth 
from $30 to $35 a ton in the stack and would have cost $7 to $8 
a ton to put it up (R. 20), as testified by Daniel Freed. The 
forage was worth fifteen cents per day per head and the repair 
bills at Deseret were $7,837.11 (R. 21-22). 
At Hatch, the pump was down 60 to 70 days with repair 
bills of $1,679.84 (R. 30) and loss of 90 days of feed for 300 
head of cattle or 900 Animal Unit Months worth $4.50 per unit 
(R. 29). The complaint was amended to reflect $7,837.11 damage 
for pumps and motors at Deseret and $29,300 for loss of hay and 
forage or a total of $37,137.11 for the first three Causes of 
Action and for the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action 
$1,679.84 for repair to pumps and motors and $4,050 for loss of 
forage, or a total of $5,729.84 (R. 114). 
Dale Brown testified that because of the way the line 
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is conducted, it would be extremely difficult for a phase reversal 
to be caused (R. 85-88) and in his opinion, it couldn't happen on 
the Power Company's system (R. 88). 
There was testimony about protective devices. The pumps 
were equipped in 1970 with time delay devices (Dep. 9, R. 18). 
Protective devices against phase reversal used to cost $5,500 to 
$7,000 (R. 104) and now approximately $200 (R. 104, Dep. 9). 
The only proof of formal notice to Power Company was 
Exhibit 5-P dated February 11, 1971 (R. 45). The Power Company's 
records contain no reports of trouble, repair work or outage on 
the Skull Valley line at or about June 18-21, 1970 (R. 51). 
A. R. Dunn testified that Exhibit 2-P is a standard 
electric service agreement and that the service of both appellants 
is subject to Regulations issued by the Public Service Commission, 
including regulations 18 and 22, portions of which appear at R. 72 
as follows: 
"Regulation 18. Continuity of Service. The Company 
shall use reasonable diligence to provide steady and 
continuous service, but does not guarantee its service 
against irregularities and interruptions. The Company 
having used reasonable diligence shall not be liable 
to Customers for any damages occasioned by irregularities 
or interruptions." 
"Regulation 22. Customer's Responsibility. The 
Customer assumes all responsibility on Customer's 
side of the Point of Delivery for service supplied 
or taken, as well as for the electrical installation 
and appliances used in connection therewith, and will 
indemnify, save harmless and defend the Company against 
all claims, demands, costs or expenses, for loss, 
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damage or injury to persons or property, in any 
manner directly or indirectly connected with, or 
growing out of, the transmission or use of electric 
service by the Customer, at or on the Customer's 
side of the Point of Delivery." 
At the close of plaintiffs' case, defendant made a motion 
jt^dism^ which was taken under advisement 
(R. 44). This motion was not renewed. The defendant put on its 
case and at the close of the case, the matter was argued and taken 
under advisement. 
The Memorandum Decision of the Court granted the defendant's 
motion to dismiss (R. 156). Order of Dismissal was entered (R. 
159-160, 167-168). Later, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law were made and entered (R. 162). 
ARGUMENT 
Point I: Finding of Fact No. 14 and Conclusion of Law 
No. 1 are based on defendant's evidence and are inconsistent with 
the Order of Dismissal. 
Point II: Finding of Fact No. 14 is not supported by 
evidence and Conclusion of Law No. 1 is unsupported. 
Point III: Review by this Court should be of plaintiffs' 
evidence only. 
Point IV: Res ipsa loquitur is applicable to the facts 
of this case: 
A. From plaintiffs' evidence; 
B. From all the evidence. 
Point V: There was a breach of the electrical service 
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agreements. 
Point VI: There was a breach of implied warranty of 
fitness. 
Point VII: Plaintiffs1 damages exceeded the cost of 
repairs of pumps. 
POINT I 
FINDING OF FACT NO. 14 AND CONCLUSION OF LAW NO. 1 ARE 
BASED ON DEFENDANT'S EVIDENCE AND ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE ORDER 
OF DISMISSAL. 
Defendant's motion, made at the close of plaintiffs1 
main case, was "to have the complaint dismissed because there 
has been no showing whatever of any negligence on the part of 
the company to support the plaintiffs' claim. I think the proof 
presented by plaintiffs has been completely lacking in attaching 
any liability to this defendant on any ground." (R. 43) 
Following statements by counsel, the Court ruled: 
"Well, I will take your motion under advisement, 
Mr. Gordon, and you can stop now or you can proceed 
without waiving your motion." (R. 44, Lines 11-13) 
The defendant elected to proceed without waiving its motion, and 
the motion was not renewed at the close of all the evidence. 
The Court's Memorandum Decision (R. 156-157) 
"finds and concludes that the defendant's motion 
to dismiss should be granted." 
And thereafter, an Order of Dismissal was prepared and signed 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-9-
(R. 159-160) and objected to by the plaintiffs for the reason 
that Findings of Fact are required by Rules 41 (b) and 52(a). 
Thereafter, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were 
prepared and submitted (R. 162-166), including Finding of Fact 
No. 14 and Conclusion of Law No. 1, which are based upon evidence 
submitted by the defendant. 
Since the only motion to dismiss made by the defendant 
was made at the close of plaintiffs1 case, the granting of the 
motion and the subsequent dismissal are of necessity limited to 
the plaintiffs1 evidence. This is true under the Federal Rule 
41(b), because under that Rule there is no provision for taking 
the motion under advisement. It follows that evidence admitted 
after the motion cannot support the Findings made to effectuate 
the motion to dismiss. Charles v. Judge and Dolph, (C.A. 7th 
1959), 263 F.2d 864. i |fiN^  1 ^ 
The Utah Rule 41(b) as to this portion of the Rule is 
identical with the Federal Rule and provides: 
"The court as trier of the facts may then deter-
mine them and render judgment against the plaintiff 
or may decline to render any judgment until the 
close of all the evidence." 
There is nothing which empowers the Court to hear the defendant's 
case and then rule on the motion to dismiss in the light of the 
defendant's evidence. The practice of taking the motion under 
advisement until the defendant has presented its evidence is 
7 
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only a delay of the ruling and not an expansion of the evidence 
upon which the ruling is made. 
POINT II 
FINDING OF FACT NO, 14 IS NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE AND 
CONCLUSION OF LAW NO. 1 IS UNSUPPORTED. 
The second sentence of Finding of Fact No. 14 is supported 
by evidence that the records of the Power Company do not contain 
any complaints or trouble calls from the customers. The first 
and third sentences of Finding No. 14 are based exclusively upon 
the silence of the Power Company's records. Gail A. Parker 
testified that the files of the Company were silent on complaints 
concerning these incidents, reports of outage, or reports of 
maintenance or repair work done (R. 50-51). It is obvious that 
if the incidents were reflected in the company's records, the 
case would not have been attended by difficulty of proof and the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur would not have loomed so signifi-
cant. But absence of reports in the company's files, and absence 
of activity by agents or employees of the company which were 
unreported are two different things. Mr. Nielson, Mr. Brown, and 
Mr. Nytch, as well as Mr. Parker, recognized the damage as 
resulting from a phase reversal and that the correction of the 
phase reversal, however caused, would have to be done by men 
(R. 58, 62, 100, Nytch Dep. 15), and the evidence was so plain 
and overwhelming that the phase reversal in the first place could 
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have been induced only by an act of man that the negative 
evidence of the power company must be rejected, since it does 
not elucidate what happened and who was responsible. 
Conclusion of Law No. 1 being based on Finding of Fact 
No. 14 must be rejected along with the Finding of Fact. 
POINT III 
REVIEW BY THIS COURT SHOULD BE OF PLAINTIFFS1 EVIDENCE 
ONLY. 
This follows from the argument made under Point I. 
Objection was made to Finding of Fact No. 14 and Conclusion of 
Law No. 1 before the trial court and the objections were denied 
(R. 170, 172) for reasons that seemed ambivalent. The entire 
record is brought before this Court to avoid further proceedings 
in the event this Court holds that even though the form of 
the Order was erroneous, the intent was to weigh the evidence 
on both sides and find in favor of the defendant. 
Appellants submit that the logical approach to the 
question is to determine whether the plaintiffs' evidence made 
a prima facie case on all of the Causes of Action, with the 
assistance of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur on Causes of Action 
1 and 4. If that be established, the question then is whether 
the evidence of defendant as reflected in Finding of Fact No. 14 
and Conclusion of Law No. 1 is supportable and dispositive of 
the Causes of Action. 
Since Findings of Fact were made, it appears that the 
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scope of review by this Court of the Findings of Fact properly 
made would be in a light favorable to the trial court and to the 
Findings. Lawrence v. Bamberger R.R. Co., 3 Utah 2d 247, 282 P.2d 
335. 
The failure of the Court to make any Findings of Fact 
as to the Second, Third, Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action, despite 
the objections of the plaintiffs thereto (R. 170), means that the 
evidence as to those Causes of Action shall be reviewed by this 
Court in a light most favorable to appellants. Davis v. Payne and 
Day, Inc., 10 Utah 2d 53, 348 P.2d 337. 
POINT IV 
RES IPSA LOQUITUR IS APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THIS 
CASE. 
A. FROM PLAINTIFFS1 EVIDENCE. 
The trial court ruled that the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur does not apply because the damage sustained by plaintiffs 
occurred entirely on their own property (Conclusions of Law, 
Paragraph 2, R. 166; Memorandum Decision, R. 156). The trial 
court's ruling was clearly an erroneous application of the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 
This Court has frequently considered the doctrine, 
which consideration has resulted in a precise definition. In 
Moore v. James, 5 Utah 2d 91, 297 P.2d 221 (1956), this Court 
declared that the doctrine would give rise to an inference of 
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negligence when three conditions are met. 
11
 (1) The accident was of a kind which, in the 
ordinary course of events, would not have happened 
had the defendant used the due care, (2) The instrument 
or thing causing the injury was at the time of the 
accident under the management and control of the 
defendant, and (3) The accident happened irrespective 
of any prticipation at the time by the plaintiff." 
5 Utah 2d at 96. 
The first condition requires a finding that the accident 
is of a type which does not ordinarily happen. Plaintiffs1 
experts testified that the damage to plaintiffsf pumps was 
caused by a phase reversal, a phenomenon which ordinarily does 
not occur and is always man-caused (R. 101 and Nytch Dep. 15). 
The first condition further requires a finding that the 
accident would not ordinarily happen unless the defendant did 
not exercise due care. The only evidence before the Court was 
that a phase reversal results from a faulty power source caused 
by a man-made, physical act of switching or reversing one 
electrical line with another. (Findings of Fact, 1[ 10, R. 165; 
Nytch Dep. p. 15; R. 101). The evidence further showed that the 
plaintiffs did not tamper or otherwise interfere with the 
electrical power lines or associated equipment at or just before 
the time of the damage (R. 8, 12, 37, 41). The highly improbable 
coincidence of a phase reversal on both plaintiffs1 ranches 
provides compelling evidence that the phase reversal was caused 
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by a lack of due care by the defendant, the common source of 
electrical power used by the two ranches. 
To conclude that a phase reversal—an event so uncommon 
as to be considered a "freak" happening—occurred simultaneously 
on two separate, unrelated ranches when no ranch employees were 
working on or were near the motors or the transmission lines and 
for lack of proof dismiss the common supplier as the cause, stretches 
plausibility to the limit. 
Reason and logic, as well as the weight of the evidence, 
compel the conclusion that a phase reversal on two separate 
ranches was an event which would not have happened had the 
defendant used due care. 
The second condition requires a finding that the 
instrumentality causing the accident was exclusively controlled 
by the defendant. The trial court apparently read this condition 
as requiring a finding that the damage have a physical situs 
within the exclusive control of the defendant. The trial court 
concluded that because the damaged pumps were physically upon 
the property of plaintiffs, and because plaintiffs maintained 
their own transmission lines and equipment, the second condition 
could not be met (Conclusions of Law, fl 2; Memorandum Decision, 
R. 166, 156). The trial court obviously confused "cause" which 
definitely must be within the control of the defendant, with 
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11
 injury" which need not be physically within the control of the 
defendant. 
The difference between the control of "cause" and 
"injury" was made readily apparent by this Court in Lund v. 
Phillips Petroleum Company, 10 Utah 2d 276, 351 P.2d 952 (1960), 
where the paint on plaintiffs' automobiles was allegedly damaged 
by some deleterious substance in smoke and soot emitted from a 
flare stack at the defendant's oil refinery. The application 
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was appropriate there, 
even though the damaged cars were under the control of the 
plaintiffs. The doctrine was applicable because the cause— 
smoke—was controlled by the defendant. The cause of the injury 
in the instant case was a faulty electrical current which was 
being supplied to both plaintiffs. Neither plaintiff had any 
degree of control whatsoever over the common source of electrical 
power which was the cause of the injury. 
The third condition requires a finding that neither 
of the plaintiffs participated at the time of the accident. The 
uncontroverted evidence is that neither of the plaintiffs nor 
their employees or agents interfered in any way with the operation 
of the pumps at the time of the damage (R. 8, 12, 37, 41). More 
important, however, is the fact that because neither plaintiff 
had any control whatsoever over the common electrical source, 
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neither plaintiff could interfere with the factual cause of the 
damage. 
All of the admissible evidence before the trial court 
leads to the inescapable conclusion that the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur should be applied. This Court has never hesitated 
to apply the doctrine when it is appropriate, such as in the Lund 
case and in the present case. In Moore v. James, supra, this 
Court held that it would be prejudicial error for a court not 
to instruct the jury on res ipsa loquitur in a case where, as 
in the present case, all of the elements have been satisfied. 
In Wightman v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 5 Utah 2d 373, 
302 P.2d 471 (1956), this Court refused to apply the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur to a fact situation which at first blush 
appears to be somewhat similar to the present case. There, the 
administratrix of an estate sued the defendant for the death 
of the deceased, which resulted from a natural gas explosion 
and fire. The defendant, as in the present case, maintained 
the means to deliver the energy source—gas—up to the home of 
the deceased, and deceased maintained the various appliances 
beyond that point. The real issue for the Court to determine 
was where the explosion occurred. The Court held that there 
was no evidence to lead the finder of fact to conclude that there 
was greater probability that the explosion occurred in that part 
of the system maintained by the gas company. 
The present case may be distinguished in several 
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important respects. In Wightman, the Court said: 
»* * * TO give rise to a jury question, there 
must be something in evidence from which the 
jury could reasonably believe that there is a 
greater probability that the explosion occurred 
in that part of the installation than in the 
pxpes or applxances installed by and under the 
control of the plaintiff. Only xf there is some 
such basis in the evidence would there be any 
foundation to permit the jury under res ipsa 
loquitur to infer that some defect or lack of 
due care on the gas company's part of the 
installation caused the leak and the resulting 
explosion." 5 Utah 2d 376. (Emphasis added) 
In the present case the coincidence of a phase reversal 
on two separate ranches makes it l^ gxjscy^  the 
phase reversal occurred in a portion of the transmission system 
maintained by the defendant Ji^giri. This proof was lacking 
in the Wightman case. 
In the Wightman case, the gas per se was not faulty. 
Rather, the gas in combination with some faulty-associated 
equipment caused the injury. In the present case, the electrical 
power was faulty or delivered in a faulty manner, independent 
of associated equipment. 
B. FROM ALL THE EVIDENCE. 
There was no evidence whatever of anyone working on 
plaintiffs1 pumps, motors, or transmission lines or of even being 
near them at the time of the outage and reversal. The experts 
agreed that there had to be an outage, transmission of energy 
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in reversed phase, then an outage, then correction of the reversed 
connections. Even the unique and completely unproven speculation 
of Dale Brown that on two ranches, at or about the same time, 
lightning shorted a single-phase device and a certain unknown 
and undescribed combination of three-phase circuitry caused a 
reversal of phases, is disproved. Dale Brown agreed that there 
had to be a correction by a man (R. 62). In this he agreed with 
Arthur Nielson (R. 100), as did Mr. Nytch (Dep. 15). Plaintiffs 
did not correct the reversal; Al Nytch did not correct it; the 
correction had to be made on the power company's line by someone 
who did not report his blunder. 
Defendant's evidence does not help establish the precise 
nature and location of the phase reversal. The real question 
is, in what form, and with what effect does the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur survive the defendant's inconclusive showing? 
Appellants submit that the effect of the doctrine survives, 
whether it be called inference or presumption, and that the 
balance of probabilities weighs heavily in favor of a finding 
that the phase reversal occurred upstream from the Hatch ranch 
and on the power company's line and was man-caused and man-corrected. 
In Lund v. Phillips Petroleum Co., supra, at page 280 
of 10 Utah 2, the Court thus described the procedure of res ipsa 
loquitur, that it permits the injured party: 
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"To present his grievance to a court or jury 
on the basis that an inference of negligence 
may reasonably be drawn from such facts; and 
cast the burden upon the other to make proof 
of what happened. This inference of negligence 
remains in the case: It justifies its submission 
to the jury; and will sustain a finding of 
negligence, even though there be countervailing 
evidence, unless such adverse evidence so con-
clusively shows non-negligence of the defendant 
that reasonable minds, acting fairly could not 
find it negligent." 
In Burghardt v. Detroit United R.R., (1919), 206 Mich. 
545, 173 N.W. 360, 5 A.L.R. 1333, at 1335 the Court, in considering 
the sufficiency of the defense of a system of inspection of 
trolley moorings, against the plaintiff's action that the trolley 
fell off the car and hit him, a pedestrian, which was held suf-
ficient to raise a prima facie case of negligence, or an inference 
of negligence, as the court's substitution for res ipsa loquitur, 
said: 
"But defendant insists that it has established 
an inspection, and that, there being direct proof 
on the subject, the prima facie case, if one was 
made by the plaintiff, must fail. This was the 
view entertained by the learned trial judge. Our 
difficulty in agreeing with this conclusion lies 
in the fact that there is no competent evidence 
of an actual inspection of the car in question. 
The most that can be said of defendant's proof is 
that it established a system of inspection 
inferentially in consonance with good railroading. 
But the proof does not establish that an inspection 
was in fact made. Where the duty to inspect exists, 
it is not discharged alone by the adoption of a 
system of inspection, or the promulgation of a 
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set of rules. The system must be used; the rules 
must be enforced; the inspection must be made. 
It was competent for the defendant to show that 
it had adopted a system of inspection, what that 
system was, that it comported with the requirements 
of good railroading; and plaintiff's objections 
to the introduction of such proof were properly 
overruled; but to overcome plaintiff's prima 
facie case it was necessary that defendant prove 
an inspection in fact. This it failed to do. 
The court, therefore, was in error in directing 
a verdict." 
In Bergen v. Tulare County Power Co., (1916), 173 Cal. 
709, 161 P. 269, the Court observed that California recognized a 
rule that where electricity is furnished to a system installed 
and operated exclusively by the owner of the premises, the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur will not apply. It nevertheless held that 
instructions to a jury involving a death that if the decedent 
was exercising ordinary care and was killed by an excessive and 
dangerous current furnished by the defendant through an electric 
light wire, it was the burden of the defendant to show that the 
excessive voltage was not due to its negligence and that this 
was not an improper extension of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
since the control of the deceased over his pumping plant could 
not have resulted in an increase of the voltage. 
And so it is in this case. The fact that the transmission 
line beyond the meter was owned by plaintiffs did not prevent 
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, because the 
evidence plainly showed that the phase reversal occurred upstream 
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from the meters and, therefore, on the line of the defendant, it 
being impossible that the outage and reversal on the Hatch ranch 
could have been caused by Deseret or that the outage and reversal 
on Deseret could have been caused from the Hatch ranch. 
Defendant's showing here also was very similar to the 
showing in Burghardt, supra, there being a system of asking 
for reports of trouble and of repairsf but with a complete absence 
of the very necessary report causing the reversal in the first 
place, and of absolute necessity of correcting the reversal in 
the second place. 
It is conceivable (although barely so) that had the trial 
judge correctly applied the rules of res ipsa loquitur, he might 
have found a sufficient defense from the evidence offered by the 
defendant. But the evidence that there were no reports and that 
the line was well-constructed were only negative proof and did 
not avoid the inference that since plaintiffs did not cause any 
phase reversal, and certainly did not correct any phase reversal, 
the events occurred somewhere on the Power Company's line. And 
the absence of reports is a sort of tacit confession that there 
was a negligent employee, who was either embarrassed or afraid 
to report what had happened, and to report that he had corrected 
a phase reversal would only have given rise to an inquiry of 
whether he had also caused the reversal. 
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POINT V 
THERE WAS A BREACH OF THE ELECTRICAL SERVICE AGREEMENTS. 
The Power Company entered into written contracts in the 
form of electric service agreements with both Deseret and Hatch. 
Pursuant to the terms of these contracts, the Power Company 
agreed to supply both Deseret and Hatch electric service in the 
amount of 150 kilowatts in the form of three-phase alternating 
current at approximately 60 cycles per second and 480 volts for 
Deseret's and Hatch's irrigation pumping operation. (Exhibit 
2-P, R. 5, 26, 50, 71) 
The evidence as heretofore discussed leads inescapably 
to the conclusion that the electrical power delivered to both 
Deseret and Hatch was defective. Neither Deseret nor Hatch 
contracted with the Power Company to receive electrical power 
which was subject to reversing phases. By delivering defective, 
harmful power, the Power Company breached its contractual 
agreement and is thereby liable to plaintiffs for any damage 
they sustained. 
While plaintiffs have not been able to find any cases 
where this Court has considered a similar situation, courts 
in other jurisdictions have frequently dealt with similar 
problems. Two older cases demonstrate that basic principles 
of contract law have always been applied to cases involving 
breach of contract by power companies. In Kimball Brothers Co. 
v. Citizens1 Gas & Electric Co., 141 Iowa 632, 118 N.W. 891 
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(1908), the plaintiff claimed that the defendant power company 
had breached the terms of a contract which required it to furnish 
electrical power for an elevator system. The elevator system 
required 240 volts of current in order to operate its three-phase 
monocylic system. While the court reversed on other grounds, it 
did hold that it was a question for the jury to determine whether 
the defendant power company was liable in damages for breach of 
contract. The Court noted that there was sufficient evidence 
to support a finding that defendant power company expressly agreed 
to furnish the amount of voltage in question. 
In Roben v. Ryegate Light & Power Co., 91 Vt. 402, 100 A. 
768 (1917), the Court recognized that a power company would be 
liable in damages for breach of contract in failing to provide 
sufficient current to operate a business concern, as it had 
contracted to do. 
It might be argued that the electrical service agreements 
in the present case do not expressly require the power company 
to deliver electrical current free from phase reversal. However, 
courts in other jurisdictions have expanded the notion of contract 
liability in public utlility cases to include situations involving 
implied contracts. In these other jurisdictions, courts have 
concluded that an agreement to supply adequate power or some 
other similar agreement will give rise to an implied agreement 
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to deliver power which is free from defects. 
In Curry v. Norwood Electric Light & Power Co., 125 Misc. 
279, 211 N.Y.S. 441 (1925), two movie theaters were allowed to 
recover when the power company's failure to provide sufficient 
power made it necessary for the plaintiff to refund the purchase 
price of admission tickets sold. The Court expressed the opinion 
that the measure of liability should be that of a common carrier 
and that any excuse for non-performance could rest only upon a 
showing that an "act of God" or an "inevitable accident" had 
caused the injury. The Court ruled that the defendant power 
company could have anticipated the situation which gave rise to 
the damages and further concluded that the occurrence was one 
which could reasonably have been anticipated and allowed a 
recovery on a breach of implied warranty theory. 
In Lund v. Princeton, 250 Minn. 472, 85 N.W.2d 1907 
(1957), the defendant power company was held liable for damages 
based on the reduced egg production in the plaintiff's hatchery. 
The power company failed to provide the plaintiff with reasonably 
adequate and continuous electrical power under an implied contract 
to do so. 
In the Lund case, the village that supplied its residents 
with electrical power determined that it would be appropriate to 
change from a Delta to a Wye transformer system and the change 
resulted in a loss of power. The village raised the defense that 
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its action was not negligence and argued to the Court that negligence 
is an element of all breach-of-contract actions. The Court pointed 
out, however, that although some breach-of-contract actions are 
necessarily based on negligence, it did not follow that all actions 
based on implied contract between a supplier and a consumer are 
dependent upon a showing of negligence. 
Defendant offered in evidence Electric Service Regulations 
approved by the Public Service Commission (R. 72). There is, of 
course, no evidence that plaintiffs were aware of those regulations. 
Regulation 18 purports to waive "irregularities and interruptions" 
to service, and liability to customers for "damages occasioned 
by irregularities or interruptions" if the Company has "used 
reasonable diligence" (R. 72). 
Sending power over a line and to a customer in reversed 
phase without notice was held actionable negligence in Sugar 
Brothers Company v. City of Monroe, 173 La. 760, 138 So. 658. 
The reversal caused the elevator controls to work backwards, 
causing the elevator to crash, resulting in repairs to the 
elevator and building and loss of profits. 
Furthermore, power in reverse appears to be more than 
an irregularity, but a dangerous condition requiring notice as 
in Sugar Brothers Company. Defendant will say it could not give 
notice if it did not know of the reversal. But it has contracted 
to deliver electricity for running electric motors attached to 
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pumps. It is charged with knowing its product to fulfill its 
contract. 
POINT VI 
THERE WAS A BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FITNESS. 
The Complaint was filed March 15, 1971 (R. 116). The 
Order granting leave to file the Amended Complaint was dated 
June 4, 1974 (R. 147). Causes of Action Third and Sixth plead 
breach of implied warranty of electrical energy of merchantable 
quality and fit for power to run electric motors and pumps. 
Written notice of this claim was given in February 1971 (Exhibit 
5-P) and on April 26, 1974 (Exhibit 9-P), receipt of which was 
admitted by the Answer to Amended Complaint (R. 148). 
The Memorandum Decision does not mention these Causes 
of Action (R. 156). Appellants objected to the failure to 
cover them in the Findings of Fact (R. 170), although Conclusion 
of Law No. 3 (R. 166) holds that no specific or implied warranties 
were made. 
Electricity is a commodity. Helvey v. Wabash County 
REMC (Ind. Court of Appeals 1972) 278 N.E.2d 608. The company 
delivered excessive voltage, causing damage to machines and 
giving rise to a cause of action under the Uniform Commercial 
Code and controlled by the statute of limitations of the U.C.C. 
The sections cited were 1-202 (2) (c), 2-105(1) (2) and 2-725(2), 
which in Utah are: 70A-1-102(2)(c), 70A-2-105(1)(2), 70A-2-725(2). 
That is why plaintiffs gave the notice required by Section 
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70A-2-607O)(a) before filing the Amended Complaint Exhibit 9-P). 
Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas Works, (1964) 413 Pa. 415f 
197 A.2d 612, holds, on the other hand, that the sale of 
electricity is a service but subject nevertheless to implied 
warranties of fitness and merchantability, and directing a 
verdict for the defendant was error. 
Appellants submit that defendant makes implied warranties 
of fitness and merchantability whether electricity be a commodity, 
or the supplying of it a service. 
POINT VII 
PLAINTIFFS' DAMAGES EXCEEDED THE COST OF REPAIRS OF 
PUMPS. 
The trial court gratuitously commented on the matter 
of damages: 
"The Court is further of the opinion that if 
damages were awarded the only actual damages 
would have been the amount spent by the plaintiffs 
in the repair of their respective motors. As to 
loss of crop and forage there is abolutely no 
showing that they suffered any loss therefrom." 
(R. 157) 
Without the pumps the land went dry and hay didn't grow 
and the crops were lost. Also, because of no water there was no 
forage. 
Deseret failed to get the customary 1,000 tons of hay 
and six weeks' pasturage for 1,000 head of cattle (R. 9, 10). 
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Daniel Freed testified to the value of the lost hay and forage 
(R. 21-22). Hatch lost 90 days of feed for 300 head of cattle 
or 900 Animal Unit Months worth $4.50 per unit (R. 29). Deseret 
used up its carry-over hay on this and other ranches (R. 24). 
Hatch lost forage for 300 head and just didn't have cattle on 
the ranch that year (R. 32). This loss of hay and forage was 
proximately caused by the phase reversal and its loss was 
compensable. 
In Community Public Service Co. v. Gray (Tex. Civ. App. 
1937), 107 S.W.2d 495, Gray sued for damage to his machine and for 
loss of profits while the machine was down resulting from reversal 
of current by the power company's employee. Both types of damage 
were allowed. 
And in Kohler v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 192 Kan. 226, 
387 P.2d 149, damage from food spoilage was allowed when the 
power company improperly cut off the power. 
Recovery for inability to raise crops on proof that 
other crops in the vicinity were raised and were not planted with 
the defective onion seed was allowed in Malone v. Hastings, 
(Cir. Ct. N.Y.), 193 F. 1, 6. See also, Putnam v. Lower, (CCA-1956), 
236 F.2d 561, 571-572. 
And here the only crop failures were on the portions 
of land irrigated ordinarily by the damaged pumps (R. 9-10, 
20-21, 29, 38). 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court erred in granting the motion to dismiss. All 
the required elements were present for application of the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur with its consequent inference of negligence 
of the defendant. Since the phase reversal occurred while no 
one was near the motors on the plaintiffs1 transmission lines, 
it is inescapable that the reversal occurred on the defendant's 
line and damaged pumps on both ranches. This transmission of 
current in reverse phase also constituted a breach of the Power 
Company's contracts with the plaintiffs and breached the Power 
Company's warranty of fitness and merchantability of the electric 
current. 
The judgment of dismissal should be reversed and the case 
remanded for trial under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and 
for determination of damages. Or, alternatively, judgment should 
be entered for the plaintiffs under the theory of breach of 
contract or breach of warranty of the electricity with remand 
for determination of damages. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID A. ROBINSON 
531 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RICHARD L. BIRD, JR. 
200 Law Building 
333 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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